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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
OF APPELLANT
Case No.

LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,

890463 CA

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:
INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to motion of appellant, this court ordered
that supplemental briefs be filed in the above-entitled case.
The motion requested that the parties brief three cases that have
been decided subsequent to the oral argument held in this case on
February 27, 1990.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath
or
affirmation,
and
particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
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Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of the State of Utah...
1, 7
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution

11

1, 7

issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized,
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
Because

the

roadblock

in the

instant

case was not

established to address a particular state interest, any intrusion
on individuals' privacy interests resulting from that roadblock
violates the Fourth Amendment.
individualized

suspicion

to

There was neither a warrant nor
justify

the

stop

of

appellant.

Consequently, Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah
was violated by the roadblock stop of appellant.

A consent

following an illegal stop does not make the fruits of that stop
admissible.

The

State must

show that

the evidence was not

obtained by police exploitation of that primary illegality and
that

the

evidence

was

obtained

by

means

sufficiently

distinguishable from the stop to be purged of the taint from that
stop.
ARGUMENT
Point I
THE
SUPREME
COURT'S
DECISION
REGARDING SOBRIETY ROADBLOCKS DOES
NOT AFFECT THE OUTCOME OF THIS
CASE.
In
U.S.

Michigan

Department

of

State

Police

v.

Sitz,

, 110 S.Ct. 2481 (1990), the Supreme Court held that

the use of sobriety checkpoints to curb the problem of drunk

driving on the highways does not violate the Fourth Amendment,
The ruling and the analysis it employs is inapplicable to this
case.

In determining that such roadblocks do not violate the

Fourth Amendment, the Court employed the balancing test described
in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979).

Brown requires courts to

balance the state's interests against both the effectiveness of
the state's action in achieving that interest and the intrusion
on the individual's privacy.
In
substantial
country

applying
weight

and

the

this

to

the problem

carnage

that

related traffic accidents.
in

accordance

with

balancing

has

test

the

of drunk
resulted

Court

driving
from

gave

in this

the alcohol

The roadblock in Sitz was established

guidelines

Checkpoint Advisory Committee."

promulgated

by

a

"Sobriety

The guidelines set procedures

governing checkpoint operations, site selection and publicity.
The committee was comprised of representatives of state and local
police, prosecutors and the University of Michigan Transportation
Research Institute.
The

roadblock

in this case was not

particular state interest.

limited

to one

Sergeant Mangelson testified that the

purpose of the roadblock was to detect any criminal or traffic
violation.
by

any

The time and place of the roadblock were not governed

guidelines

to

limit

the potential

travelers.
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interference

with

In Sitz, the drunk driving problem was balanced against
the

effectiveness

intrusion.
to

law

of

the

procedure

and

the

nature

of

the

The Court focused on the minimal objective intrusion

abiding

citizens

and

rejected

the

Michigan

emphasis on the subjective intrusion to motorists.

court's

The Court

then noted that the analysis of the degree to which the seizure
advances the public

interest

"was not meant to transfer from

politically accountable officials to the courts the decision as
to which among reasonable law enforcement techniques should be
employed to deal with a serious public danger."

Id. at 2483.

The court found that the checkpoint resulted in the DUI arrests
of 1.5 percent of the drivers stopped.

This was greater than the

percentage of arrests made at the permanent border checkpoint
that was upheld in United States v. Martinez-Fuente, 428 U.S. 543
(1976).
The nature of the stop and length of the intrusion for
the general motoring public involved in the roadblock at issue in
the instant case was not great.

However, since there was no

particular reason to make the stop, there is no way to enter the
effectiveness

of

the

intrusion

into

the balancing

equation.

Therefore, the balance of the interests in this case indicates
that the Fourth Amendment was violated.
made

to

solve

a particular

and

When an intrusion is not

significant

law

enforcement

concern, the stop is indistinguishable from that conducted in

-4-

Brown v. Texas, to check identification.

It is also closely

analogous

stops

to

violations

the

which

roving
Delaware

random
v.

vehicle

Prouse,

440

U.S.

for
684

traffic
(1979)

prohibited.
The Court in Sitz did not allow roadblocks to be used
for

general

substantial

crime

detection.

problem

of

The

drunk

intrusion of the roadblock.

Court

driving

held

justified

that

a very

the

minimal

In this case, the general need to

detect crime cannot be used to justify seizures that are not
based on any showing of individualized suspicion.
allowed,

the

Fourth

Amendment

would

be

If that were

meaningless.

The

roadblock in this case fails to pass the balancing test employed
in Sitz; consequently, it violated the Fourth Amendment.

The

evidence seized from appellantfs vehicle as a result of that stop
must be ordered suppressed.
Point II
A WARRANTLESS STOP OF A VEHICLE CAN
ONLY BE JUSTIFIED BY A SHOWING OF
PROBABLE CAUSE AND AN EXIGENT
CIRCUMSTANCE
THAT
PRECLUDES
OFFICERS FROM OBTAINING A SEARCH
WARRANT.
In State v. Larocco,

P.2d

, 135 U.A.R. 16 (Utah

1990), the court addressed the issue of whether the inspection of
a

vehicle

identification

number

(VIN)

violated

the

Fourth

Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
The court of appeals held that the opening of the vehicle door to

-5-

look at the VIN did not implicate any Fourth Amendment interests.
State

v.

Larocco,

742

P.2d

89

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1987).

On

certiorari Justice Durham authored an opinion that was joined by
Justice Zimmerman.

In that opinion, Justice Durham found that

the VIN inspection violated Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.
In State v. Larocco, Justice Durham held that Article
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah required the State to
show that there was both probable cause and exigent circumstances
to justify a warrantless vehicle search.

The basis of this

holding was a need to simplify the rules regarding warrantless
vehicle stops.
rulings

on

She reviewed the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment

such

inconsistencies,
misapplication

stops
she

of

and

held,

the

found
were

doctrine

them
a

inconsistent.

result

relating

of

to

the

the

The
Court's

reasonable

expectation of privacy as it affected the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Durham noted that the expectation of privacy
doctrine

was

originally

Amendment was implicated
recent

cases

the

employed

to determine

if the Fourth

in a search or seizure.

Supreme

Court

has

used

the

However, in
level

of

the

claimant's expectation of privacy to determine if a warrant is

-6-

required.
Fourth

This has resulted

Amendment

improperly
2

reasonableness clause.

in the warrant clause of the

being

to

determine

if

as

part

of

the

In Larocco, Justice Durham's position

was that the question of the privacy
issue

read

Article

I,

interest
Section

14

is a threshold
of

the

Utah

Constitution is implicated.
Justice Durham then found that Article I, Section 14
contains two separate requirements and both must be satisfied to
3
find a warrantless search valid.
There must be a showing that
the search was reasonable (based on probable cause). There must
also be a showing

that a warrant was obtained or there were

See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), and California v.
Carney, 471 U.S., 386 (1985).
2
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath
or
affirmation,
and
particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
3
Article I, Section 14 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or
thing to be seized.

-7-

exigent circumstances that prevented the officers from obtaining
a warrant.

With respect to exigent circumstances, Justice Durham

stated ". . .warrantless searches will be permitted only where
they satisfy their traditional justification, namely, to protect
the safety of police or the public or to prevent the destruction
of evidence."

135 U.A.R. at 23.

In Larocco, Justice Durham found that the officers had
probable cause to believe the vehicle in question was stolen.
However,

there

were

no

exigent

circumstances

to

justify

warrantless opening of the vehicle door to check the VIN.

the
With

respect to roadblocks, the problem is that there is neither a
warrant, exigent circumstances, nor individualized suspicion that
a crime has been committed.
opening brief.)
both

(See, Point I B. of appellant's

Consequently, a roadblock stop fails to meet

the requirements of Justice Durham's Larocco standard.

On

this basis, the roadblock stop violates Article I, Section 14 of
the Constitution of Utah.
This conclusion is reinforced when the rationale used
to justify a roadblock is considered.

In Michigan Department of

Public Safety v. Sitzy a balancing test was employed to determine
if a sobriety
State's
action

roadblock violated

interest
taken

to

the Fourth Amendment.

The

is balanced against the effectiveness of the
achieve

individual's privacy.

that

interest

and

the

intrusion

to

This reasoning was expressly rejected in

-8-

Larocco.

It fails to account

Fourth Amendment.

for the warrant clause of the

Furthermore, the analysis of privacy interests

is misapplied.
In

Larocco,

Justices

Howe

and

Hall

joined

in

a

dissenting opinion and concluded that under a Fourth Amendment
analysis, the inspection of the VIN did not involve a search
implicating Fourth Amendment interests.

The dissenters relied on

New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), which held that a similar
VIN inspection did not constitute a search.
Justice
Durham's opinion.

Stewart

concurred

in the result

of Justice

There was no indication of what his view is on

Article I, Section 14.

However, in cases authored both before

and after Larocco, Justice Stewart has required that warrantless
searches be made pursuant to the specific and well established
exceptions to the warrant requirement.

State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48

(Ut. 1981); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Ut. 1989); State
v. Arroyo,

P.2d

, 137 U.A.R. 13 (Ut. 1990).

In other

words, it does not appear that Justice Stewart would be willing
to engage in the type balancing of analysis that disregards the
Fourth Amendment's warrant

requirement.

With respect

to the

roadblock in this case, there was no warrant, and there is no
exception

to

the warrant

requirement

to justify

the search.

Although Justice Stewart's opinions on Article I, Section 14 are
unknown, a roadblock search would not appear to fit within his
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.

The

important

conclusion

that

can

be

reached

with

respect to the effect of the Larocco decision on this case are
twofold.

First, at least two justices of the Utah Supreme Court

would likely hold that a roadblock violates Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution.

Second, based on his prior opinions,

it would appear that Justice Stewart would begin his analysis by
discussing whether the roadblock
established
roadblock

exceptions

to

the

fell within one of the well
warrant

requirement.

Since

stops do not fall within such an exception, it is

likely that Justice Stewart would reach the same conclusion on
roadblocks as he did on warrantless VIN inspections in Larocco.
The effect of Larocco would

likely be a finding by the Utah

Supreme Court that the roadblock was unconstitutional and the
evidence would be ordered suppressed.
Point III
THE STATE MUST SHOW THAT ANY
CONSENT WAS NOT OBTAINED THROUGH
THE EXPLOITATION OF THE ILLEGAL
STOP.
In State v. Arroyo, supra, the Utah

Supreme Court

reversed the Court of Appeals1 holding that a voluntary consent
in and of itself alleviates the taint of a prior illegal stop or
search.

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Ut. App. 1989)

supreme

court held

that there must be

First, there must be a voluntary consent.

The state

a two part analysis:
Second, the consent

must not have been obtained through police exploitation of the

primary or antecedent police illegality.

To be admissible, the

State must show the evidence was obtained by means sufficiently
distinguishable from the illegal stop to be purged of the primary
taint.
The court went on to note that the basis of the second
part of this analysis is found in the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine established in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963).

With respect to the manner in which this doctrine

related to consent searches, the court stated, "The 'fruit of the
poisonous tree' doctrine has been extended to invalidate consents
which, despite being voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation
of a prior illegality."

137 U.A.R. at 16.

The court then cited

with approval cases that reached that same conclusion.
The

legal authority on this

issue for the decision

employed in the court of appeals was the Tenth Circuit case of
United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir.), cert, den.
479 U.S. 914 (1986).
decision

in Carson

However, the Supreme Court found that the
failed to provide adequate protections to

Fourth Amendment interests.
be

permitted

to

ratify

The court stated, "Police should not

their

own

illegal

conduct

by merely

obtaining a consent after the illegality has occurred."
16.

Id.

at

The court went on to find that the Carson rule failed to

effectuate either of the two purposes of the exclusionary rule.
First,

police

are

not

deterred

-11-

for

violating

the

Fourth

Amendment.

Second, the courts became a party to that illegal

conduct.
The

position

taken

by

appellant

throughout

these

proceedings is that all of the fruits of the illegal stop should
4
be ordered suppressed.
The same arguments adopted by the court
5
in Arroyo were previously made by appellant.
The remedy ordered
in Arroyo was to remand the case to the district court for that
court to make findings on the question whether the consent was
obtained through exploitation of the primary illegality, or if
the consent was obtained by means sufficiently distinguishable to
be purged of the primary taint.

Assuming that the roadblock stop

violated either the Fourth Amendment or Article Ir Section 14 of
the Utah Constitution, this case should be remanded for the trial
court to make appropriate findings on the "fruits" issue.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in the Sitz case does not
legitimize the roadblock
Amendment.

The

in the instant case under the Fourth

Larocco

decision

gives

added

authority

to

appellant's argument that the lack of individualized suspicion
makes the roadblock at issue in this case unreasonable.
the

Arroyo

case

makes

untenable

appellee's

position

Finally,
that a

4
See: Opening brief of appellant at pp. 20, 38;
appellant at p. 5.
5
See Point II of Appellant's reply brief.
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Reply brief of

voluntary consent makes the fruits of any stop admissible.

The

roadblock stop of appellant's vehicle violated both Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution.

The judgment

and conviction

should be reversed and the case remanded to the district court to
determine if the evidence seized from the search of appellant's
vehicle was obtained through exploitation of that illegality.
DATED this

day of August, 1990.

G. FRED METOS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Supplemental Brief of Appellant was mailed/delivered to
Dan R. Larson, Assistant Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this
1990.

-13-

day of August,

